Deepening neoliberalism via austerity and ‘reform’: The case of Ireland by Fraser, Alistair et al.
38
DEEPENING NEOLIBERALISM VIA 
AUSTERITY AND ‘REFORM’: THE 
CASE OF IRELAND
Abstract 
The current economic crisis – the ‘great recession’ 
– raises numerous questions about neoliberal ideas 
and practice, not the least of which is whether (and if 
so, how) neoliberalism can survive it. Our paper takes 
on these issues using the case of Ireland. This is the 
first proper neoliberal crisis in Ireland. From the early 
1990s to 2008, Ireland was held up by many neoliberal 
champions as a place that gained from deregulation, 
openness to inward investment, and low corporation 
tax rates. But the build-up of contradictions in Ireland 
exploded rapidly in 2008, when its property bubble 
burst and private banks and government finances 
collapsed. Rather than examining what caused 
Ireland’s crisis, we look at what has happened between 
2008 and 2013. We focus on structural adjustments 
regarding the property, finance, and labour markets 
and then on the government’s austerity programme 
as a whole. In addition to demonstrating how these 
adjustments have been an attack on workers and ordi-
nary citizens, we identify some particularly striking 
elements, which we use to argue that a new phase 
of disturbance and restructuring is deepening and 
extending neoliberalism’s influence in Ireland.
Key Words: neoliberalism, Ireland, structural 
adjustment, austerity, Europe. 
Profundizando el Neoliberalismo por la vía de 
la austeridad y la reforma: el caso de Irlanda
Resumen
La crisis económica actual –la gran recensión- 
plantea varias preguntas acerca de las ideas y prácticas 
neoliberales, incluyendo si y de que manera, puede el 
Neoliberalismo sobrevivir la presente crisis. Nuestro 
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artículo aborda estas preguntas utilizando el caso de 
Irlanda. La crisis actual es la primera crisis Neoliberal 
que ocurre en Irlanda. Desde principios de los 90s 
hasta el 2008, varios defensores del neoliberalismo 
sostenían que Irlanda era un lugar que se beneficio 
de la desregulación, la apertura a la inversión y los 
bajos impuestos a las corporaciones. Sin embargo, en 
el 2008, la acumulación de contradicciones llevo a 
que explotara la burbuja de la propiedad, seguida del 
colapso de los bancos privados y las finanzas guberna-
mentales. En este articulo, vez de examinar las causas 
de la crisis Irlandesa, nos enfocamos en los eventos 
que ocurrieron entre 2008 y 2013. Específicamente 
en el ajuste estructural concerniente a la propiedad, 
finanza, mercados laborales y luego en el programa 
gubernamental de austeridad en su conjunto. Además 
de demostrar como estos ajustes constituyen un ataque 
a los trabajadores y ciudadanos, identificamos algunos 
elementos llamativos para proponer que una nueva 
fase de disturbio y restructuración esta profundizando 
y extendiendo la influencia del Neoliberalismo en 
Irlanda.
Palabras clave: neoliberalismo, Irlanda, ajuste 
estructural, austeridad, Europa.
Introduction 
We are living through the world’s first full-scale 
neoliberal capitalist crisis – an existential crisis that calls 
into question the future of these peculiar and nefarious 
ideas and practices. The crisis has demanded atten-
tion from critical scholars because of the dominance 
of neoliberal ideas about how the capitalist economy 
and polity should be organized (e.g. see Harvey, 2003, 
2005; Klein, 2007; Peet, 2009). Processes of neoliber-
alization underway in the last forty years – based on 
ideas and practices revolving around privatization of 
state-owned assets, deregulation of economic sectors, 
and openness to investment flows – have generated a 
most extraordinary and unjust redistribution of wealth 
and power from working to ruling classes, particularly 
the owners and controllers of transnational industrial 
and financial corporations. And neoliberal adherents 
and champions have successfully managed to colonize 
the world of ideas; that is, dominating debates about 
the past, present, and future, and normalizing its key 
tenets of ‘freedom’ (to accumulate, primarily) and 
‘rights’ (to, as far as possible, be left alone by the state, 
albeit with important exceptions, not least in times of 
crisis) (Frank, 2000). They have restored class power to 
capitalists (Harvey, 2003) and fundamentally shaped 
the terms of debates about the way society, the state, 
and the market should interact. 
In this paper, we question how adherents and 
practitioners of neoliberal ideas seek to deal with 
the contemporary crisis, the ‘great recession’ which 
has been unfolding since 2008. Although in partic-
ular contexts it appears to be merely a crisis of state 
revenues or of one sector of the capitalist economy, 
we view the current crisis as a first-order crisis with 
origins in capitalism’s deepest internal relations. At 
issue is demand and how it can be generated. If not by 
credit, as has been the approach in recent years, then 
via what strategies is the neoliberal capitalism show 
to be kept on the road? Whereas Keynesian economic 
thinking calls for interventions to get production 
going in times of crisis, neoliberal ideology, as we are 
seeing currently, calls for greater ‘freedom’ for entrepre-
neurs, debt-repayment, and deeper austerity. But the 
problem of demand persists because, ‘Wage repression 
produces a deficit of effective demand that is covered 
by increasing indebtedness that ultimately leads into a 
financial crisis which is resolved by state interventions 
which translates into a fiscal crisis of the state that can 
best be resolved, according to conventional economic 
wisdom, by further reductions in the social wage’ 
(Harvey, 2010). Crucially, the absence of demand pres-
ents a serious problem for cash-rich investors: lacking 
a clear sense of when demand of sufficient quantity 
will emerge, they horde rather than spend and employ, 
thereby exacerbating the problem (Harvey, 2005, 
2010). The most fundamental issue today is therefore 
material inequality and the extraordinary extent to 
which neoliberalism has enabled employers and the 
owners of capital to acquire an enormous and growing 
share of the surplus. For the global capitalist economy 
to find a way out of the crisis, spending in the order 
of hundreds or indeed thousands of billions of dollars 
is needed.1 But just such a scale of investment is hard 
1 Indeed, Harvey (2010) argues that US$1.7 trillion of 
new profitable investment opportunities per year need to 
be generated by the global economy in order to absorb 
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to create without the straightforward (but for neolib-
eral practitioners, seemingly unthinkable) solution of 
redistributing wealth. Whether (and why, or why not) 
attempts to resolve the crisis move in this sort of direc-
tion is one question for the sort of research critical 
scholars must undertake. 
However, an important complicating factor here 
is that neoliberalism has developed alongside a process 
of globalization, which gives a certain shape to the 
capitalist economy that alters the sorts of relationships 
that might develop between central banks and the 
decisions of investors, not least about when and where 
to invest capital. For example, even if the European 
Central Bank lowers interest rates in the crisis-ridden 
Euro-zone or pumps billions of Euros into its banking 
system to encourage the sort of investment capitalism 
needs, there is little compulsion for European banks 
to lend that money locally, hence no guarantee that 
European workers will, as a result, find employment. 
Nor is it certain that such liquidity will be invested 
productively at all; indeed, the restructuring of 
‘advanced’ economies away from production towards 
increasingly speculative activities virtually guarantees 
that it will not. Globalization also makes it hard for 
solutions to the crisis to be found, not least because 
of the growing reliance on China. Just as politicians 
and finance ministers in Europe might look to China 
to generate demand, so they are confronted with the 
peculiarities of capitalism’s uneven development there. 
As Hung (2009), notes, the Chinese state faces an 
enormous challenge in overcoming the political and 
economic power of coastal elites if it is to deliver on 
the demand for a more balanced form of development 
between coastal and interior regions. He argues that 
the challenge is to ‘stimulate the growth of domestic 
demand by increasing the working classes’ dispos-
able income [but such] a redirection of priorities has 
to involve moving resources and policy preferences 
away from the coastal cities to the rural hinterland, 
where protracted social marginalization and under-
consumption have left ample room for improvement’ 
(p.24). Such nuanced dynamics of globalized capi-
talism – how the tensions internal to one economy 
existing surplus capital and return the capitalist system to a 
compound growth rate of 3%.
reach into and complicate the tensions in distant 
others – make it difficult to imagine how capitalism 
can put to work the millions of unemployed workers 
in the so-called ‘advanced economies’, never mind the 
billions enduring a ‘wageless life’ (Denning, 2010) in 
the ‘global south’. Capitalism seems to need some-
thing other than neoliberal ideas and practices but 
there remain few signs that such a shift is underway. 
In this general context, therefore, we argue it is 
important that scholars analyze not just the many 
causes of the current situation, but also how decision-
makers in government or in institutions of the national 
(and supra-national) state try to deal with it. Are deci-
sion-makers rolling back or extending and deepening 
neoliberalism? What ‘innovations’ are conjured up 
in the hope of restoring growth? In what ways does 
the more global context shape the strategies of ruling 
classes in particular places? In other words, just what 
are ‘the imperatives, ability and the willingness of 
different governments to use their powers (either indi-
vidually or collectively) to confront the crisis’ (Harvey, 
2010)? Our paper considers these sorts of questions 
using the case of Ireland, a capitalist economy in 
which Gross Domestic Product slumped by 11.1% 
between 2008 and 2011 and unemployment soared 
from 4.8% in early 2008 to 14.2% in 2013. We ask 
how its political and ruling class – that is, its leading 
politicians, governing political parties, as well as capi-
talists in the banking, finance, property and other 
sectors – have sought to find a way to handle, resolve, 
or indeed displace the numerous problems that have 
emerged from the crisis in Ireland. 
Ireland is a particularly interesting case study for 
two reasons. One is that it was so widely acclaimed 
as a shining example of what could be achieved if a 
state enacted deregulation, privatization, and left itself 
open to global capital flows, even if its emergence as 
a beacon of neoliberal practice was in some respects 
accidental, ‘the product of a complex set of unfolding, 
interconnected, often serendipitous, processes held 
together by a strategy of seeking to attract and service 
FDI’ (Kitchin et al., 2012a: 1306). Its rapid descent 
therefore calls into question the efficacy of these 
approaches to capitalist development. 
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The second reason is about the peculiar way Irish 
workers and citizens have negotiated the crisis. As we 
will discuss, Ireland entered into an €85bn bailout 
agreement with the European Commission of the 
European Union, the European Central Bank, and 
the International Monetary Fund (widely referred to 
in Ireland as the EU-ECB-IMF ‘troika’) in late 2010. 
Under the terms of this agreement, the Irish govern-
ment has pursued a wide range of ‘structural reforms’. 
Of course, there have been other such bailouts in 
Europe – in Greece, Portugal, Spain, and most recently 
in Cyprus – but Ireland sticks out because its bailout 
and the associated austerity has not been met with 
significant sustained resistance from trade unions and 
civil society. There have been protest marches, demon-
strations, and campaigns against particular aspects of 
government policy, but even amidst deep cutbacks 
in state spending and rising unemployment, only 
3,695 days were lost to industrial disputes in 2011, 
the lowest number since records began in 1985. And 
in 2011, the Irish electorate overwhelmingly voted 
for two parties that promised to implement austerity 
rather than oppose it, as many argued was possible 
and necessary. It is almost as if the general populace 
has given their passive consent to the austerity. In this 
sense, Ireland appears to be somewhat of an oddity, a 
place deserving attention from critical scholars inter-
ested in the machinations of corporate and political 
power and the embodiment of class relations within 
contemporary austerity programmes.  
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. We 
begin by briefly introducing Ireland’s crisis, before 
examining three elements of the Irish state’s adjust-
ment and austerity programme. We specifically focus 
on adjustments in the areas of property and finance, 
the labour market, and state spending. In a discussion 
and conclusion, we reflect upon the way that neoliberal 
ideas and practice have been deepened and extended 
via new processes and patterns of disturbance.
Ireland’s Crisis 
Much of what we need to discuss about the causes 
of Ireland’s crisis is well-documented elsewhere (e.g. 
see Allen, 2007; Finn, 2011; Kitchin et al., 2012a; 
O’Toole, 2009; Ross, 2009), hence the brevity of the 
following discussion. Ireland was one of the poorest 
states in Europe in the 1980s but rose to become one 
of the wealthiest (at least, in terms of GDP per capita) 
by the mid-2000s. It achieved this transformation via 
European supports, inward investment propped up 
by a low rate of corporation tax, and labour market 
reforms (including a pact between private capital, the 
state, and trade unions which was designed to secure 
peaceful and stable conditions in the public sector that 
would form the basis for accumulation to occur in the 
private sector). In the last few years of this growth 
spurt, however, Ireland’s property market entered a 
highly contagious, high-risk bubble phase. Property 
values, property-related lending, and employment in 
the construction sector all dramatically increased. For 
example, the total value of mortgage debt ‘increased, 
from €47.2 billion in 2002 to over €139.8 billion at 
the end of 2007’; and house prices followed a similar 
trajectory, reaching a peak of €322,634 for the average 
new home (a 382% increase since 1991) (Kitchin et 
al., 2012a: 1308).  
All of this fell apart from 2007 onwards. The 
banks were among the first casualties, with the state 
extending to them an unlimited guarantee of their 
liabilities in late 2008, thereby socializing their losses 
– a move widely hailed as the worst decision ever made 
by an Irish government (e.g. see Münchau, 2010). 
Numerous firms in the construction sector began 
collapsing under the weight of enormous debts to Irish 
and foreign banks. As the crisis unfolded further, it hit 
all other sectors of society. Unemployment – which 
had fallen from about 200,000 in the mid-1990s to a 
low of 67,000 in 2001 – surged rapidly from 100,000 
in 2007 to 300,000 by 2010. The state’s finances dete-
riorated. Although the Fianna Fáil government began 
an extensive and deep austerity programme, escalating 
borrowing costs and capital flight forced it to accept 
an EU-ECB-IMF bailout in late 2010. The sovereign 
Republic had reached a new nadir. In a general elec-
tion in 2011, Fianna Fáil was voted out and a new 
coalition government of Fine Gael and Labour took 
office. Since 2011, and not surprisingly given that the 
new regime has continued with the austerity policies, 
matters have deteriorated further. Even a team of IMF 
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specialists expressed alarm at Ireland’s situation, noting 
in a recent review that: ‘Involuntary part-time employ-
ment increased, and migration patterns reversed, with 
Irish citizens emigrating in search of jobs. Long-term 
unemployment has risen sharply, raising the risk of 
permanent skill losses among jobseekers and hence a 
decline in potential output in future’ (IMF, 2012: 58). 
Against this backdrop, numerous analyses of 
Ireland’s situation have emerged in the last few years. 
By far the largest volume of work on the run-up to the 
crisis has been conducted by prominent Irish commen-
tators and journalists (e.g. see O’Toole, 2009; Ross, 
2009). For its part, the critical academic literature 
on Ireland’s crisis is actually quite thin. Finn (2011) 
has positioned Ireland’s crisis relative to the broader 
European question, as well as Ireland’s geo-historical 
development since independence. In addition, there is 
a rich contribution from Kitchin et al. (2012a), which 
provides an excellent overview of the property bubble’s 
growth and the state’s attempt to resolve the property 
problem via the National Asset Management Agency 
(NAMA). Finally, Kitchin et al. (2012b) demonstrate 
some of the complex local specificities emerging from 
the bubble, particularly in the so-called ‘ghost estates’ 
scattered throughout the country.2 Our contribution 
to this literature is to examine what has happened in 
Ireland since 2008. But rather than only looking at 
adjustments in the property sector, as per Kitchin et 
al. (2012a), we also examine adjustments in the labour 
market and in state spending. Our aim is to identify 
some of the most striking effects of these adjustments 
with a view to shedding light on the specific way 
Ireland’s neoliberal crisis is unfolding. We choose this 
organization because it follows the prioritization of 
the Irish government.
Reform and adjustment in the finance and 
property sectors 
Without question, everything about the crisis in 
Ireland has been shaped by the state’s bank guarantee, 
announced on 30th September 2008 amidst fears that 
Ireland’s so-called ‘pillar’ banks would collapse under 
2  Numerous additional contributions have been posted by 
academics, many of them geographers, on the Ireland After 
Nama blog at http://irelandafternama.wordpress.com. 
the weight of bad loans and falling deposits. In one 
move, the state assumed responsibility for all debts and 
deposits held in the six main Irish financial institu-
tions, amounting to €485bn or 271% of GDP (Drudy 
and Collins, 2011). The state then made further inter-
ventions in the banking system and property markets: 
by February 2009, two of the six financial institutions 
(Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building 
Society (INBS)) were fully nationalised; that same 
year, a total of €11bn was injected directly into the 
three biggest banks, Allied Irish Banks (AIB), Bank 
of Ireland (BoI) and Anglo. By June 2011, AIB, Irish 
Life & Permanent and EBS were effectively national-
ized and the state took a larger stake in BoI. Further 
restructuring has occurred, such as the state’s deci-
sion in 2011 to subsume EBS within the much larger 
AIB and, perhaps more notably, the move to form 
the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC) from 
state-owned Anglo and INBS, the two most reckless 
lending institutions during the bubble. In short, the 
banks have been bailed out by the state in what is a 
massive departure from the neoliberal narrative of 
minimal state intervention. Indeed by June 2012 they 
had received €64bn from the state. With a mortgage-
default crisis still looming large on the horizon, more 
support will yet be required. The obvious implication 
of these interventions has been the wholesale transfor-
mation of private debt into public debt. The burden 
of paying for one of the biggest property and banking 
collapses in the history of capitalism has been thrust 
onto workers, taxpayers and ordinary citizens. But 
within the specifics of these adjustments, there are 
some interesting features that speak to the way Ireland 
is negotiating the crisis.
In late 2009, for example, the government 
created the National Asset Management Agency 
(NAMA), taking into state ownership a huge portion 
of the banks’ impaired loan books, mostly relating to 
commercial property. It paid €32bn against the banks’ 
valuations of €77bn, but even at this lower valua-
tion point NAMA looks set to struggle to recover the 
state’s spending over its ten-year lifespan (see Kitchin 
et al., 2012a), not least because property prices are 
still falling in Ireland where most of the ‘assets’ are 
located. NAMA has pursued some of the debtors, for 
example by appointing receivers to 93 of its 190 major 
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borrowers, and taking possession of €500m of assets 
that had been transferred by debtors to their spouses 
and other relatives in an attempt to preserve their 
wealth (Irish Times 2011a). Some of these moves have 
been quite high profile, such as proceedings against 
Treasury Holdings and NAMA’s support for the 
nationalized Anglo Irish Bank (IBRC) in a legal battle 
with failed-capitalist Sean Quinn, Anglo’s largest 
debtor owing €2.88bn. In these cases, therefore, the 
state’s bad bank is actively engaged in reconfiguring 
power relations in Ireland, although only in cosmetic 
ways that tinker around the edges of the political 
economy by shifting assets and wealth between elites. 
NAMA’s moves in this regard alter Ireland’s place 
in the world (if one sign of Irish capitalism’s successful 
use of neoliberal ideas and practice was the presence of 
Irish property-owners in London, New York, Berlin, 
or Budapest, then high profile fire sales of those assets 
are equally emblematic [Financial Times, 2012]), as do 
some of the state’s other actions in the property sector. 
In particular, the creation of new property investment 
opportunities highlight some of the ways in which 
the state is becoming more entrepreneurial by insti-
tuting new arrangements that seek to facilitate foreign 
finance capital more overtly, or by pursuing a degree 
of legal and financial engineering aimed at altering 
the particular way Irish and international finance and 
property sectors interact. Thus, NAMA has offered 
‘vendor financing’ (€2bn thus far) in the commercial 
property market to extend loans to prospective buyers 
for up to 70% of the market price of office buildings 
and other commercial assets on its books. As outlined 
by Frank Daly, Chairman of NAMA, the bad bank’s 
strategy here is intended to ‘unlock’ (NAMA, 2012: 
6) international investor interest in Ireland’s commer-
cial property sector. It is also instructive to note that 
the government’s Finance Bill 2013 has devised new 
policy instruments, most notably Real Estate Invest-
ment Trusts (REITs), to entice international investors 
to acquire unsold commercial and residential assets. 
The outcome of this move is uncertain, but one possi-
bility is that foreign institutional investors might 
take a considerable stake in the residential property 
sector, particularly unsold apartment developments 
in central Dublin which offer considerable potential 
for increasing investment returns in the private-rental 
sector. Traditionally, the residential market in Ireland 
has been the domain of small-scale property capital 
with institutional investors and larger funds hitherto 
steering clear of this riskier property type. 
In the banking and finance sector, too, post-crisis 
adjustments have altered Ireland’s position relative 
to the wider flows of capital. Perhaps the most note-
worthy of these has been the withdrawal of foreign 
banks such as Halifax (Bank of Scotland) and Northern 
Rock; in addition US corporate giant Liberty Mutual 
Insurance entered the Irish market by purchasing 
Quinn Insurance in 2012. These moves alter Ireland’s 
economy in incremental but serious ways. Liberty, for 
example, will pay dividends to its parent company, 
which means profits earned in Ireland, a lot of which 
was held and reinvested domestically, will be repatri-
ated to US shareholders.3 Tactics such as these – where 
US (and other) multi-national corporations buy up 
distressed assets4 in a form of ‘vulture capitalism’ – are 
entirely consistent with the tenets of neoliberal struc-
tural adjustment programmes devised specifically for 
the exploitation of national assets by foreign capital in 
developing countries. 
Crucially, however, at the same time as the 
state has tried to re-engineer the finance and prop-
erty sectors, some key structural components have 
been protected and indeed boosted. For example, 
in February 2013 the coalition government pushed 
through emergency legislation in a special all-night 
sitting of the Dáil to liquidate Anglo/IBRC. The 
government’s rationale was to delay the repayment 
of state-backed promissory notes on the Anglo/IBRC 
3 Meanwhile, the departure of Halifax (Bank of Scotland) 
and Northern Rock will further reduce competition in the 
banking sector and improve the prospects for Irish state-
owned and merged banks.
4 Of note here is the decision by the giant U.S. private-equity 
and venture capital company, Blackstone, to purchase the 
Burlington Hotel, one of many ‘distressed assets’ owned by 
IBRC (formerly the notorious Anglo Irish Bank). Bought by 
an Irish property developer in 2007 for €288m, Blackstone 
paid just €67m (a discount of 77%) in November 2012 
(Irish Times 2012a). Blackstone had also been contracted by 
IBRC to advise on the divestment of its (formerly Anglo’s) 
remaining Irish and British loans of €30bn. 
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debt due in March 2013 and instead to swap them 
for long-term sovereign bonds. Additionally, as part of 
the deal, the government directed NAMA to purchase 
€15bn of IBRC debt from the Central Bank of Ireland 
and to transfer IBRC’s remaining assets to the NAMA 
portfolio. While these moves may serve to reduce the 
state’s annual debt repayments in the short term, it has 
exposed the Exchequer and NAMA (and by extension 
Irish citizens) to further losses; it remains the case that 
senior bondholders will be paid in full while NAMA 
and the Exchequer must cover any further shortfalls 
arising from the disposal of IBRC assets (IMF, 2013). 
The key aspect to note here is that when it comes to 
decision-making about banking debt, the state has 
been swift to act. Successive governments have intro-
duced urgent measures that effectively solidify bank 
debt as sovereign debt and deepen the state’s commit-
ment to ensuring that workers and citizens bear the 
burden of such debts. Also notable here is the absence 
of such swift and urgent government action to deal 
with mortgage and other forms of personal debt.
In addition, although they made a commitment to 
ban upwards-only rent reviews, an oddity of Ireland’s 
commercial property sector, the new government has 
maintained these types of leases. This move follows on 
from the introduction of capital incentives for invest-
ment property in Budget 2012, which means investors 
buying commercial property before the end of 2013 
will not pay tax on capital gains provided the proper-
ties are held for at least seven years, a move designed 
to bolster the commercial property sector. Meanwhile, 
the government introduced a flat €100 residential 
household charge in 2012, followed by a new (IMF-
backed and crude) market-valuation-based residential 
property tax. Under well-publicised threats of signifi-
cant financial and legal penalties for non-payment, 
most households are likely to face new property-tax 
bills of €202 in 2013 and €405 in 2014. 
Given all of these adjustments, it seems abun-
dantly obvious that the new coalition government 
has sought to reinforce the power of property inves-
tors, thus ensuring that potential returns to (invest-
ment) property will be maximized, even in a declining 
market. Fundamentally, the responses to the property 
crash in the form of REITs, vendor financing and 
the capital investment plan are attempts to free-up, 
increase and enable further investment, as is evident 
from NAMA’s recent (as of early 2013) decision to 
invest €2bn in new development and development 
completion, which contrasts sharply with the substan-
tial level of cuts in state spending in other non-prop-
erty-related sectors of the economy. Indeed, with 
each successive state response signalling a deepening 
prioritisation of – and further support for – property, 
banking and finance sectors, these types of interven-
tions become normalized. It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that NAMA supports at least 100 devel-
opers, many of whom are receiving salaries in excess 
of €100,000, at the same time as the government aims 
to pass a Personal Insolvency Bill which will empower 
banks to scrutinize and veto the spending of home-
owners in mortgage arrears. Indeed, the question of 
mortgage arrears is one of the most fraught and unre-
solved elements of the Irish crisis. At the end of 2012, 
almost one-fifth of all residential mortgages were in 
arrears, with the remaining outstanding balance on 
those mortgages-in-arrears amounting to over €30bn 
(Central Bank of Ireland, 2013).5 Just how the banks 
will handle these debts is unclear, but a vicious pursuit 
of households in arrears seems likely. 
Labour sector adjustments 
In addition to adjustments in the property and 
finance sectors, Ireland’s response to the crisis has 
been aimed at labour. One major line of attack on 
labour has specifically targeted public sector workers. 
The first part of this was a pension levy and pay cut 
which resulted in a 14% reduction in take-home pay 
for all public sector workers (LRC, 2013). In addi-
tion, staff numbers were cut by about 15,000 between 
2008 and 2010. These attacks were followed in June 
2010 by a Public Service Agreement (PSA) between 
the government and public sector unions. Known 
locally as the Croke Park Agreement, it entailed a 
pay freeze between 2010 and 2014. As such, while 
nominal wages have remained stagnant, real wages 
have declined at a rate equivalent to the annual rate of 
5 These figures include all arrears on principal-dwelling and 
buy-to-let mortgages at the end of 2012. Arrears of more 
than 90 days amounted to 13% of the total number of 
mortgages (Central Bank of Ireland, 2013). 
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inflation.6 But the agreement also included numerous 
other ‘reforms’. One was an Employment Control 
Framework (ECF) for each sector, which placed a 
moratorium on recruitment and froze promotions, 
thereby stunting career paths within the sector; by 
February 2013, the agreement had delivered a reduc-
tion of staff numbers by 17,300. Overall, the agree-
ment reduced the government’s public sector pay bill 
by c. €1.5bn between 2010 and 2012. 
This attack on public sector workers has continued 
and deepened. In February 2013 the government 
reneged on the PSA agreement and announced a 
revision of its terms in consultation with the major 
unions, culminating in a new draft agreement dubbed 
‘Croke Park II’. The new proposals are even more 
hostile to public sector workers. The draft agreement 
proposed direct pay reductions of between 5.5% and 
10% for workers earning over €65,000; the timeline 
for the ECF will be extended to 2016; and contro-
versial measures introduced in the first PSA, such as 
mandatory ‘flexible redeployment’ of staff ‘within and 
across sectors’ of the public service and potentially 
in an entirely different geographical area, have been 
deepened and extended through ‘workforce planning’ 
and ‘Workforce Action Plans’ that ‘support manage-
ment in identifying the skills deficits as well as staff 
surpluses within organisations…’ (LRC, 2013: 9). 
Furthermore, whereas the first PSA gave management 
greater surveillance powers to monitor workers’ activi-
ties through the introduction of ‘performance verifica-
tion’ aided by sector-wide ‘performance management 
systems’ (Department of PER, 2010: 4-5), the new 
proposed deal will entail new ‘performance improve-
ment action plans’ for individuals with ‘performance 
issues that need to be addressed over a defined time-
frame’ (LRC, 2013: 12). If the government’s approach 
to the first PSA involved shaking the confidence of 
public sector workers by adjusting their expectations 
regarding pay and conditions, the latter agreement 
seeks to entrench neoliberal-style work practices and 
conditions as the new norm in the public sector. 
6  The cumulative rate of inflation since 2010 until February 
2013 is 4.6%: 2010 (-0.93); 2011 (2.59); 2012 (1.72); 
2013 (1.21). Thus, including the pension levy, pay cuts, 
and inflation considerations, direct cuts to income since the 
onset of the crisis are between 24.1% and 28.6%.  
Without any doubt, these agreements are intended 
to discipline labour, not just in the public sector but in 
the workforce as a whole. Even though the proportion 
of workers covered by collective agreements had fallen 
at an EU-leading rate in Ireland between 2000/01 
and 2008/09 (ILO, 2012: 41), the state’s public sector 
workers still demonstrate that not every worker has to 
labour under insecure, overly-flexible conditions and 
for low pay. In these ways, the state’s response to the 
crisis has been to attack labour with a view to achieving 
a greater return of economic output to capital (which 
has been achieved – see Figure 1). 
The aforementioned attacks on public sector 
workers map neatly onto attacks on labour in the 
private sector more generally. Most visibly, private 
sector workers have been hit by redundancies, contrib-
uting to a current unemployment rate of 14.2% as 
private sector employment numbers have been slashed 
by 18% since the second quarter of 2008 (IMF, 
2012: 63). Many firms have also used the crisis as a 
way of increasing the rate of exploitation of workers 
by reducing staff numbers and/or cutting wage rates 
irrespective of profitability. Moreover, all workers in 
Ireland have been struck by new policies that stem 
directly from the EU-ECB-IMF bailout agreement. 
For example, one of the ‘structural reforms’ aimed at 
‘facilitat[ing] adjustment in the labour market’ and 
‘reduc[ing] the risk of long-term unemployment’ 
(Department of Finance, 2010: 20) extended the 
‘inability to pay clause,’ which encourages employers 
to renege on wage agreements.7 
Other labour market changes are intended to 
reform ‘the system of activation policies’, for example 
via: ‘the introduction of instruments to better iden-
tify job seekers’ needs (“profiling”)’; ‘more effec-
tive monitoring of jobseekers’ activities with regular 
evidence-based reports’; and ‘the application of sanc-
tion mechanisms for beneficiaries not complying 
with jobsearch conditionality’ (p.21). Thus, under 
the supervision of the Minister for Social Protection, 
7  The Inability to Pay Clause enables employers not to pay all 
or some of the pay increases due in a wage agreement. The 
clause is part of recent national wage agreements. At present, 
it cannot be invoked more than once in a five-year period, 
but the EU-ECB-IMF agreement looks set to change that.
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Labour Party TD Joan Burton, the government has 
moved to ‘reform’ the state’s welfare system. Reminis-
cent of Workfare programmes in the US (MacLeavy 
and Peoples, 2009; Peck, 2001), these reforms include 
a Pathways to Work programme that aims to ‘ensure 
that each person in receipt of job-seeker payment 
fulfils their personal responsibility to engage fully 
with the employment and training supports provided 
by the State, as a pre-condition for receipt of their 
welfare payments’ (Department of Social Protection, 
2012: 9). More generally, the plan explicitly aims to 
re-think the state’s relationship with the unemployed. 
This move reflects general neoliberal thinking in the 
area of welfare reform, which seeks to ‘activate’ the 
unemployed even if, as in Ireland’s case, there are 
few jobs to be had. In the absence of employment 
opportunities, Ireland’s Pathways programme looks 
to push the unemployed onto a Community Employ-
ment system in which they work for 19.5 hours per 
week in community organizations or groups – with 
the other hours of the work presumably intended 
to be dedicated to becoming ‘more active in their 
efforts to find work’ (p.10) – in return for which they 
receive a small extra amount (at least €20) on top of 
their welfare payment (FÁS, 2012). In so doing, the 
government aims to reach into the households and 
communities most affected by the crisis and alter the 
socio-economic realities of unemployment 
in an effort to re-imagine the relationship 
between Ireland’s industrial reserve army 
and the state. Rather than an inevitable 
feature of life in a capitalist society, unem-
ployment is now constructed and managed 
as an individual and personal failing. Path-
ways is therefore fundamentally about 
structurally adjusting the unemployed via 
micro-scale changes that reorient attitudes 
towards welfare and exert pressure on those 
in work to accept poorer working condi-
tions – exactly the sort of change that 
employers believe will re-position Ireland 
within the competitiveness league tables. 
That such changes will have negative conse-
quences for all workers goes without saying; 
likewise, it is hard not to conclude that this 
sort of ‘reform’ is intended to boost net emigration in 
Ireland, which has totalled just under 90,000 between 
2010 and 2012 (CSO, 2012).  
Curiously, however, but certainly not unexpect-
edly given the dominance of neoliberal thinking in 
Ireland, another of the state’s responses to the crisis has 
secured taxation relief for elite, ‘highly skilled’ foreign 
workers. For example, under the Special Assignee Relief 
Programme (SARP) introduced in the 2012 budget, 
an employee can make a claim to have 30% of their 
income between €75,000 and €500,000 disregarded 
for income tax purposes. The legislation was partly 
drafted by Deloitte and KPMG (Irish Times, 2012b), 
with numerous other interest groups, including the 
American Chamber of Commerce, offering support. 
The underlying hypocrisy of allowing high-earning 
workers to escape taxation whilst low-paid workers 
and those relying on welfare are attacked is particu-
larly striking, as is the way SARP reflects the Irish 
state’s continued commitment to touting for inward 
investment using whatever tax tricks it can muster. 
It is also illuminating because SARP reflects Ireland’s 
effort to position itself as a financial services centre 
and a new high-technology location focusing on inno-
vation in areas such as bio-technology, social media 
and cloud computing. That so much of the country’s 
Figure 1: Labour share of economic output (GDP), 1960-2013 Source: 
Compiled using data from European Commission (2011) Statistical Annex of Euro-
pean Economy, Autumn 2011. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
publications/european_economy/2011/pdf/2011-11-10-stat-annex_en.pdf
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misplaced property investment is intended to meet 
the demands of these sorts of investors – in areas such 
as Dublin’s docklands – highlights the extent to which 
labour market reforms of this sort are central to the 
so-called ‘recovery’ programme.
General austerity
The third and final element of post-crisis adjust-
ment in Ireland is a general programme of austerity. 
From a relatively strong position in 2006 and 2007, 
the Irish government’s finances deteriorated rapidly 
as the crisis unfolded. Exchequer tax revenues all 
but collapsed from €47bn in 2007 to just €31.8bn 
in 2010, while spending commitments continued, 
generating large budget deficits. To adhere with the 
EU’s Stability and Growth Pact, which calls for budget 
deficits of no more than 3% of GDP, the outgoing FF 
government began implementing far-reaching fiscal 
adjustments; the new Fine Gael and Labour coali-
tion government elected in 2011 has continued on 
the same course, albeit one influenced by the terms 
of the troika bailout. The adjustment as a whole has 
entailed efforts to raise funds via asset sales, such as 
the privatization of forests, but more significantly via 
wide-ranging spending cuts in social welfare, health-
care, education, and capital investment. The form 
these cutbacks have taken and their effects on Irish 
society speak volumes about the way adjustment has 
occurred. The headline here is that material inequality 
in Ireland has increased. Government savings have 
been sought by attacking many of the most vulnerable 
in society, whilst also extending relative protection 
to those on higher incomes; that is, as indeed many 
(no doubt, well-paid) commentators in Ireland point 
out, austerity has hit high-earners but not nearly as 
viciously as those on low incomes. 
This pernicious orientation to austerity was 
evident from the outset. For example, in Budget 
2010 (announced in late 2009), the FF government 
announced reductions in social welfare payments of 
€760m, including cuts in Child Benefit and Disability 
Allowance, with the latter rate reduced from €204.30 
per week to €196, an €8.30 per week cut, which 
affected 96,000 people and saved the government 
€41m a year. In the same budget, however, and at a 
time when its calamitous position gave it plenty of 
scope to do so, the government left corporation tax 
untouched at 12.5%. A year later, Budget 2011 further 
reduced the social welfare bill, this time by €873m. 
There was a reduction of €8 per week for adults 
claiming the personal rate of Jobseeker’s Allowance 
and a health and income levy on earnings was replaced 
by a new Universal Social Charge of 7%, which was to 
apply regardless of whether earnings were €20,000 or 
€200,000 (TASC, 2010: 8), thereby hitting those on 
low incomes in a highly regressive manner. 
Following the 2011 election, the FG-Labour 
government’s first budget – Budget 2012, the first 
supervised by the troika – cemented and further 
entrenched the process of regressive austerity, not least 
via an increase in the standard rate of Value-Added 
Tax (VAT) from 21% to 23%. The budget also hit 
poorer families by reducing child benefit payments 
and tightening entitlements to payments for back-to-
school clothing and footwear, cuts which would have 
even harsher effects on the, ‘lowest income household 
grouping in society [which] is the single parent with 
children group. This group was targeted with cuts to 
the one parent family payment, cuts to child benefit 
for the third and subsequent children and cuts to 
the back to school clothing and footwear allowance’ 
(TASC, 2011: 2). Yet again, however, the government 
steered away from hitting those on higher incomes, 
thereby living up to pre-election promises not to 
increase income tax. Partly for this reason, the budget 
was warmly welcomed by influential business elites as 
‘pro-business pro-growth’ (Irish Times, 2011b). 
Finally, in Budget 2013 the government pursued 
an adjustment of €3.5bn via spending cuts and new 
taxes. Standout changes included a further €450m 
reduction in the social welfare budget, including a 
reduced rate of child benefit; over €1bn in healthcare 
cuts; and adjustments to the universal social charge 
to gain revenue from those over aged 70 (Govt of 
Ireland 2012). In addition, the budget included some 
particularly regressive measures such as increase in Pay 
Related Social Insurance (PRSI) contributions, but 
in a form that especially hit low-paid workers. More-
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over, the unemployed were targeted via a three-month 
reduction in the duration of jobseeker’s benefit, which 
is paid to the newly-unemployed. Meanwhile, pension 
tax relief, which overwhelmingly benefits the wealthy, 
was left untouched in the budget and higher earners as 
a whole again avoided income tax increases. 
Plainly, the upshot of all these adjustments is 
that inequality in Ireland has increased. For example, 
Ireland’s Gini coefficient increased from 30.7 in 2008 
to 31.1 in 2011 (CSO, 2011): whereas the average 
income of the highest income quintile was 4.6 times 
that of the lowest income quintile in 2008, by 2011 
the ratio was 4.9. These slight increases in certain 
measures of inequality need to be seen alongside 
measures of poverty and deprivation, which illustrate 
the depth of Ireland’s crisis. For example, whereas 
13.8% of the surveyed population experienced two or 
more types of enforced deprivation in 2008, almost 
one quarter (24.5%) fell into this category by 2011 
(CSO, 2011). In addition, while the percentage 
of people in consistent poverty in 2008 was 4.2%, 
this had increased to 6.9% in 2011. If one aim of 
neoliberal adjustments is to re-assert class power, in 
part by increasing inequality, then Ireland’s austerity 
programme has done its job. 
Discussion
How can we make sense of Ireland’s case, not least 
the fact that the austerity programme has not faced 
significant resistance? As has been noted elsewhere 
(e.g. see Storey 2011), Ireland’s story since 2008 
smacks of what Naomi Klein (2007) calls the ‘shock 
doctrine,’ via which neoliberal champions exploit 
crisis periods to push through policies and ‘reforms’ 
that claim to be about crisis resolution, but in fact 
tend to have highly problematic social impacts on 
workers and other citizens. Using examples from a 
wide range of places around the world – including 
Chile, Bolivia, Mexico, numerous places throughout 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and then Russia (see also Harvey, 
2003, 2005; Peet, 2009) – Klein argues that this sort 
of opportunism often occurs via structural adjustment 
programmes following on from IMF debt bailouts. 
Although it has not been labelled as such, we argue 
that Ireland’s austerity programme must be viewed 
as just such a structural adjustment programme: one 
with cutbacks, deregulation, and efforts to reconfigure 
class relations not least by socializing private losses in 
the financial sector. However, in trying to grasp the 
Irish case, we argue that the shock doctrine does not 
quite capture what has occurred. Rather than a series 
of shocks – rather than inflicting injuries “all at once” 
(Klein, 2007: 7) – something slightly more subtle and 
incremental has been happening in Ireland. To help 
characterize this approach in Ireland, consider some-
thing Marx and Engels wrote about capitalism in a 
famous passage of The Communist Manifesto:
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without 
constantly revolutionising the instruments 
of production, and thereby the relations of 
production, and with them the whole rela-
tions of society. Conservation of the old modes 
of production in unaltered form, was, on the 
contrary, the first condition of existence for all 
earlier industrial classes. Constant revolution-
ising of production, uninterrupted disturbance 
of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty 
and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch 
from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen rela-
tions, with their train of ancient and venerable 
prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all 
new-formed ones become antiquated before 
they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, 
all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last 
compelled to face with sober senses his real 
conditions of life, and his relations with his 
kind (Marx and Engels 1967; our emphasis).
We argue the idea of ‘uninterrupted disturbance’ 
is an accurate way to characterise the first few years 
of Ireland’s structural adjustment. Of fundamental 
importance here is that the adjustment in Ireland 
has been about the gradual but constant shaking of 
workers’ confidence; chipping away at any gains they 
might have made, frightening and agitating them with 
apocalyptic warnings about economic collapse and 
the dire state of the country’s finances. Thus, at one 
stage Irish (and indeed foreign investing) capitalists 
seek to strike at private sector pay rates and employ-
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ment; and then at another, the state tries to scare its 
employees (and indeed their labour union leadership) 
to accept consecutive rounds of pay freezes, pay cuts, 
and deteriorating working conditions as well as rolling 
back the welfare state in the name of competitiveness. 
Elsewhere, ‘innovations’ such as NAMA, the almost 
silent and invisible repayment of bondholders, and 
a host of other minor but important policy adjust-
ments dump more debt onto workers and citizens, 
or disturb the property market in ways that lock-in 
privileges and rights that will inevitably benefit only 
a wealthy minority. The adjustment in Ireland has 
been characterized by this gradual, experimental 
process: one that entails examining what works (the 
first PSA, for example) and trying to go for more (as 
the attempted second PSA indicates); but also exam-
ining what fails (attempted cuts in minimum wages, 
say) and testing alternatives, such as the Pathways to 
Work programme. Just as Harvey (2005: 13) notes 
that capitalist states everywhere more or less stumbled 
into neoliberalism – just as neoliberalization entails 
experiments, trials and errors – then the unavoidable 
conclusion to draw about the adjustment in Ireland 
is that it entails a sustained but experimental effort at 
disturbing, shaking, agitating, and unsettling workers 
and their existing social conditions with the outcome 
of increased, everlasting uncertainty and agitation.  
Why Ireland has seen a process of uninterrupted 
disturbance rather than the shock doctrine is obvi-
ously up for question. We argue two factors are impor-
tant. One is that, unlike those places targeted during 
the heydays of structural adjustment in the 1980s 
and 1990s, Ireland’s crisis has not entailed rampant 
inflation. There simply has not been any need to push 
for the short sharp shocks that neoliberal policy advi-
sors looked for in Bolivia, say. In addition, currency 
devaluation, one of the main weapons of the shock 
doctrine, has not been possible in Ireland given its 
membership of the Eurozone. Further, although it 
seems from the Cyprus case that the ECB has adapted 
its approach to such an extent that shock tactics are 
now on the table (most notably a ‘haircut’ on savings 
over €100,000 and a raft of capital controls), at the 
time of the Irish bailout the ECB seemed to be more 
intent on achieving some degree of crisis resolution 
without having Ireland splashed across the front 
pages. Thus, a structural adjustment programme was 
to take place in Ireland, but without any headlines 
about capital controls or other radical moves.   
The second factor leading to uninterrupted distur-
bance in the Irish austerity programme is Ireland’s 
position as an export platform, one so heavily depen-
dent on foreign investment (as much as 90% of export 
sales from Ireland go to foreign-owned firms (Forfás 
2010). Thus, both austerity-era governments and 
the troika have sought to implement the structural 
adjustment without a significant upsurge in industrial 
action. As the first PSA clearly displays, the aim has 
been to avoid a wave of strikes by securing the sort of 
‘stability’ promised to Ireland’s foreign inward inves-
tors by the Irish Development Agency, along with its 
allies in the Irish Business and Employers Confed-
eration and the American Chamber of Commerce. 
Just such peace has indeed been achieved in Ireland: 
although they have called some protest marches and 
demonstrations, Ireland’s public sector unions have 
thus far been remarkably calm. The gradual, quiet 
and indeed subtle process of shaking the confidence 
of workers and citizens has been able to achieve the 
government and troika’s aims, whilst minimizing the 
disruption to the economy’s core private sector firms. 
Indeed, the degree of industrial peace in Ireland has 
helped the state return to the international bond 
markets in advance of the bailout period ending. Any 
confidence investors might have in Ireland is bound 
up with the continuation of work, with the absence of 
strike action or any other form of significant militancy. 
Crucially, moreover, uninterrupted disturbance in a 
place such as Ireland has had the added advantage of 
further atomizing society, deepening the already stark 
divisions that exist between different strata of Ireland’s 
workforce. Had the government pursued the sort of 
shock therapy that some influential commentators 
argued was necessary, the great threat was that Irish 
workers might have discovered more about what they 
had in common and developed a sense of their poten-
tial as a united force against the coalition seeking to 
dump the bank debts onto their shoulders. Uninter-
rupted disturbance, not shock therapy, has been the 
effective approach to extending and deepening the 
grip of neoliberal ideas and practice in Ireland. 
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Conclusion
In summary, we have outlined structural adjust-
ment measures regarding finance and property, the 
labour market, and state spending. In each area, we 
have highlighted particularly striking effects, such as 
the re-positioning of Ireland relative to wider financial 
flows; labour market changes designed to discipline 
Irish workers, ostensibly to improve their competi-
tiveness, whilst also creating new elite labour market 
segments that aim to draw in new investment; and 
new efforts to activate and mobilize the unemployed, 
most notably the government’s Pathways programme. 
We use these sorts of adjustments – examples of the 
‘topographies and topologies’ (Kitchin et al., 2012a) of 
Ireland’s encounter with neoliberal ideas and practices 
– to argue that efforts to deal with the crisis deepen and 
extend the hegemony of neoliberal ideas and practice. 
But while the new policies and programmes use the 
shock of crisis to disturb and disrupt specific aspects 
of Irish society and economy, they utterly fail to alter 
the patterns of decision-making and strategizing that 
got the country into the mess it is facing. Rather, the 
trajectory of Ireland’s crisis period from 2008-2012 
has been dominated by the state’s effort to rescue the 
domestic financial system via an act of class restora-
tion that redistributes the burden of paying bank debts 
from financial and property elites to ordinary workers 
and citizens. Further, although there has been consid-
erable domestic pressure on both crisis-period govern-
ments to force bondholders to absorb some losses on 
their investments in Irish institutions, the European 
Central Bank – with support from US Treasury Secre-
tary Timothy Geithner (Kelly, 2011) – has resolutely 
opposed such a move. In this sense, Ireland plays a role 
in sending a message to investors that banking crises 
will be paid for by general austerity; that is, private 
debts in the financial sector will become socialized. 
The lesson here is a familiar one: financialisation 
of the economy hinges on states enforcing finance 
capital’s dominance over citizens. Locally, moreover, 
insofar as the Irish state has made efforts to restore the 
property market by actively reconfiguring the owner-
ship of assets, it is the members of the same class of 
financial elites with greatest access to liquid capital 
that stand to gain the most from such moves. Nothing 
about Ireland’s story suggests there is any prospect 
of a redistribution of wealth to reduce inequality; 
rather, Ireland’s neoliberal policy regime has firmly 
steered decision-makers towards policies that deepen 
inequality, often with perverse effects. In conjunction 
with these material rearrangements, moreover, there 
has been an ideological readjustment involving the 
construction of new rationalities suited to the needs 
of a more punitive and volatile mode of governance. 
Enactment of the bank guarantee was crucial in this 
regard because it provided the straightjacket within 
which public discussion and policy-making would 
be constrained. Instead of debating the existing (and 
alternative) structural responses to the crisis, a suppos-
edly pragmatic, technical exercise in revenue genera-
tion and cost-cutting initiatives took centre stage. The 
government and the troika now have a mandate to 
introduce more entrenched neoliberal measures. 
Clearly, therefore, the response to Ireland’s crisis 
reveals the essential nature of neoliberal ideas and prac-
tice: not withdrawal of the state from the economy, but 
heavy intervention on the side exclusively of finance 
capital. Thus, Peck et al. (2009: 105-6) were correct to 
caution about the rush to issue neoliberalism’s death 
warrant emphasising that ‘neoliberalism was both 
conceived and born as a crisis theory [and] has been 
repeatedly remade through crises’. The problem is 
that, once neoliberal ideas gain a foothold they prove 
difficult to displace, as indeed the case of Ireland high-
lights: a case of more neoliberalism to fix a neolib-
eral crisis. In many respects, of course, this is what 
we should expect. Without any significant upsurge 
in protest or the formation of new political alliances 
on the left, it is hardly surprising that neoliberal ideas 
and practice have continued to exert influence in 
Ireland. As the case of Ireland’s Special Assignee Relief 
Programme illustrates, moreover, there are powerful, 
well-resourced and articulate champions of neolib-
eral policy, such as KPMG and their ilk -- exactly the 
sorts of social forces outside the state that manage to 
out-manoeuvre and drown out critical voices in civil 
society; the same forces, moreover, that create a situa-
tion in which, as Peet (2011: 32) notes, ‘the neoliberal 
state is imposing sanctions – not on the speculators, 
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but on the hardworking people whose taxes bailed out 
the financial system! Austerity is punishment for the 
crimes of the wealthy, but is imposed on everyone but 
the culprits’. In this sense, deepening and extending 
austerity in Ireland is just another means of achieving 
the more general neoliberal aim of redistributing 
economic output to capitalists. It is, then, and indeed 
overtly, class warfare.
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